Canada, known for its opposition to the 2003 Iraq war, was making arrangements to support the U.S.-led invasion by deploying naval ships if approved by the UN Security Council, as disclosed in cabinet records. The minutes from the final cabinet meetings prior to the invasion revealed the government’s readiness for potential UN authorization of military actions, illustrating the weight of this possibility on ministers engaged in philosophical debates on life and death.
The U.S. initiated the invasion under the pretext of disarming Saddam Hussein of alleged weapons of mass destruction that were never discovered. President George W. Bush’s administration framed the conflict as part of the broader war on terror following the September 11 attacks nearly two years earlier.
Prime Minister Jean Chrétien formally announced in the House of Commons that Canada would not participate in the U.S.-led “coalition of the willing” in Iraq on March 17, 2003, just before the invasion commenced. This decision garnered a standing ovation from his party during question period.
Simultaneously, the U.S. retracted a resolution from the Security Council that would have authorized military action after encountering likely defeat. Obtained through an access to information request, the cabinet meeting minutes from February 25, 2003, revealed that Canada, despite not being able to offer ground support due to commitments in Afghanistan, considered the possibility of sending ships if the UN approved military intervention.
Retired general Raymond Henault, who was the chief of the defence staff in 2003, affirmed that the documents aligned with his communication to the government regarding potential contributions by the Canadian Armed Forces to the Iraq war if Canada chose to participate.
Canada had ships in the Persian Gulf conducting counterterrorism and counter-smuggling operations at that time. Discussions between U.S. and Canadian officials, as revealed by a U.S. diplomatic memo published by WikiLeaks in 2011, explored how these ships could be utilized as the invasion unfolded.
Despite not receiving a response from a Chrétien representative for an interview, reflections on the decision to abstain from the war highlighted an assertion of Canada’s sovereignty. The government’s stance was reminiscent of Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson’s independent decision-making during the Vietnam War era.
The cabinet, as evidenced by additional documents from an access to information request, generally supported Chrétien’s decision and emphasized the importance of principled leadership in post-conflict Iraq reconstruction and the fight against terrorism.
The war’s aftermath created a power vacuum that facilitated the emergence of ISIS as a significant threat in Iraq, prompting Canada and allies to intervene in 2014 to combat the militant group and prevent terrorist activities targeting the West.
The final discussions during the cabinet meeting in February 2003 delved into ethical considerations surrounding war and the justification for taking lives, reflecting on the divisions among allies and the implications of diminishing multilateralism. Senator Percy Downe described the atmosphere at that time as emotionally charged, given the gravity of the decisions and their potential human toll.